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I. Introduction
September 11, 2001 was the day American society joined the rest of the world in tragically
and most painfully experiencing, on its home soil, the "dark side" of globalization' - the
reactive and perverse ideology of global terrorism.2 It was by design that the physical objects
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1. Globalization is not an end result, rather, it entails a complex series of linked, at times competing and
opposed, processes and changes in our economies and societies that began to arise over the past several decades
- due in part to the exponential innovations in electronic, computer, telecommunications, and transportation
technologies (including, of course, the advent of a "global information highway"); the relentless expansion and
increased sophistication and competiveness of multinational enterprises; the demise of the Soviet Union and
its communist satellites throughout Central and Eastern Europe; the decline of the Welfare State; a relatively
general worldwide embrace of the "Washington Consensus" promoting greater liberalization and deregulation
of economic and financial markets; the rise of privatisation or "corporatization" (as denominated in Mainland
PRC) of large sectors of what were previously state-owned and controlled economic activities; and global and
ongoing debt crises that have continued for over two decades. All this has come to question traditional patterns
of international business, investment and finance and related governmental and regulatory approaches. What
make globalization qualitatively different from conventional notions of "internationalisation" are the elements
of interconnectedness and interdependence. See, inter alia, presentation by J. Norton, Selective Bank 'Environmental'
Developments - Supervisory Trends Entering the 21st Century, ch. 14, in 2 IMF, CURRENT ISSUES OF MONETARY
ANn FIN'CIL LAw 91-155 (2001); see also J.A. SCHOLTE, GLOBALIZATION -A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (2000).
2. Globalization is about more than economic, business, and financial markets and activities; it touches the
political, social, cultural, technological, and even religious "soul of a society." Thus, the globalization processes
create inherent conflicts, tensions, and "pushes and pulls" within a society (e.g., global rise of religious fun-
damentalism, the extreme forms of which can spill over into irrational societal volatility). Also, globalization
does not mean necessarily "global order." To a large extent, to date at least, it has meant global disorder - not
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of the terrorist attack were the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in the heart of the
Manhattan, New York financial district and the Pentagon in our nation's Capital - the
financial and military supremacy of the United States are viewed by many of the extreme
opponents of globalization as the primary pillars and beneficiaries of the unfolding modem
global economy and society.3 And it was no coincidence that not only a major military target
was chosen as the target for attack, but also a major civilian center was picked that would
ensure significant civilian casualties. This is the ultimate, calculated extension of what truly
has become an ideology of unparalleled evil - where the ends justify all means, where
human life is expendable, and where terror is being used as a global historical force to alter
the course of world events (economic, political, societal).4
What happened on September 11 was not just a crime: It was one of the most heinous
crimes American society has known throughout its history. In fact, it was of such magnitude
that it was classified as an act of unjust war. The U.S. Executive and Congress naturally took
to action and the result was the enactment of the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act.' The Act's
deliberately designed acronym, USA PATRIOT,6 calls upon the patriotism of every Amer-
ican to play his part in fending against the terrorist threat. This article argues that Title III
of the Act, "International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act
of 2001"1 puts the patriotism of U.S. financial institutions to the ultimate test and raises a
series of resulting tensions in American, Western, and other modern-oriented societies.
The responses to September 11 quickly assumed global dimensions. The influence of
U.S. legal policy was also very evident both within other domestic jurisdictions and in the
international arena and fora. A consensus immediately emerged, or rather seemed to exist,
that going after the terrorist money is a key instrument in this war against terrorism. Such
consensus would translate into duties and obligations on financial institutions around the
world.
The legal developments and issues arising in the aftermath of September 11 are too
recent, too numerous, and too comprehensive to admit the drawing of final conclusions at
this point in time. A period of experience, evaluation, and balanced reflection will be needed,
along with ongoing "two-way" consultation with our key allies in this war and with the
main international foray. This article attempts to describe the legal developments to date
with respect to financial institutions and systems in the United States, at the international
and European Union levels, and in another key domestic jurisdiction-the United King-
dom. In this context, financial institutions and systems can have differing relevancies, such
as a victim of global terrorism, an instrumentality, or a private "policeman." At the end of
this description, the article attempts to summarize the trends being established by these
legal developments and the extent to which these developments may represent new trends
a global economic-financial system, but a global-financial non-system. Further, the globalization processes are
not necessarily rational or coordinated in nature, rather, they can often bring about an environment of irra-
tionality, dysfunction, uncertainty, and violence. Id.
3. See, e.g., YossEF BODANSKY, BIN LADEN: THE MAN WHO DECLARED WAR ON AMERICA (2001).
4. It is the author's perception that terrorism, though different in each country context, has taken on an
overriding ideological and strategical framework. Compare id. and AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM,
OIL, AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA (2000).
5. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
6. This acronym is included in the Act's official short title. 18 U.S.C. § 1.
7. USA PATRIOT Act, tit. III, 115 Stat. at 296-342.
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in money laundering law. This will be followed by a discussion of the perceived implications
for the financial community and the community's response. In its conclusion, the article
calls for a moment of reflection on the fundamentals of our current legal and economic
order and how they may or may not interrelate with the current post-September 11th
environment.
II. September 11: The Responses
Three decades ago congressional response to an upsurge in crime would probably not
have lured bankers or brokers away from their computer screens and financial statements.
But over the past decade money laundering prevention has become a core approach to
crime control and a central precept to international banking standards. So now, the exec-
utive and legislative enthusiasm shown respecting this U.S. response to September 11 im-
mediately means: Financiers beware! This section focuses particularly on the obligations
created by the USA PATRIOT Act.
What needs to be kept in mind at the start, though, is that all the basic domestic and
international "building blocks" for the use of the money laundering prevention regime were
already in place pre-September 11 for an attack on the financial resources of terrorists and
terrorist-affiliated organizations. Since the questionable enactment of the 1972 U.S. Bank
Secrecy Act' primarily addressing tax evasion, the U.S. money laundering prevention re-
gime has expanded significantly over the decades, both domestically and internationally, to
target a much wider notion of "criminality," with the United States coming to "spearhead"
a global approach through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) based at the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris.9
A. THE UNITED STATES' RESPONSE
Ironically, during the early days of the Bush administration antagonism between the
United States and its fellow members of the OECD emerged over the money laundering
control regime. The U.S. Treasury was becoming cynical of the intentions of the European
members and sensed that the international money laundering regime was beginning to be
used to achieve tax harmonization at levels higher than what the Bush administration would
be willing to commit U.S. citizens. As a result, the United States showed signs of with-
drawing some real level support and started a process of reassessing the costs of money
laundering law and regulations to the private sector as a prelude to reducing the burden.
In fact, even before the new Bush administration, the U.S. Congress was becoming leery
of further heightened money laundering legislation. For example, a money laundering con-
trol bill submitted to the Congress in 1999 failed to secure any significant support.
This being said, U.S. authorities pre-September 11 had recognized that a banking or-
ganization's best protection against criminal activities was its own internal controls con-
sisting of policies and procedures designed to identify and understand with whom it was
conducting business, to identify suspicious clients and activities, and to coordinate with
8. 31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq.
9. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, THE 2001 NATIONALMONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY
(Sept. 2001), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/docs/m/2001.pdf (elaborating on the existing
(pre-Sept. 11) framework and building blocks in the United States).
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appropriate government agencies and officials about those suspicious clients and activities.
The Basel Committee's Money Laundering principles, and substantive regulatory and su-
pervisory guidance issued by the U.S. banking authorities, provided a comprehensive frame-
work for banking organizations to implement and to identify money laundering activities
and procedures in place, developed pursuant to the above referenced regulatory and su-
pervisory guidance. 10 The Bank of New York (Russia) and Citibank (Mexico) money laun-
dering cases underscored the sophistication of money laundering activities and perhaps the
failure of large U.S. banking organizations to successfully implement and enforce anti-
money laundering programs." Specific areas that banking authorities already were focusing
on in connection with these and other cases included: (1) Know Your Customer (KYC)
Rules, (2) enhancing due diligence on private banking activities; (3) reviewing relationships
with non-U.S. correspondent banks and shell banks, and (4) monitoring wire transfers for
patterns of money laundering activities.'
2
In fact, a U.S. National Money Laundering Strategy (National Strategy) was released in
March 2000. This is a comprehensive framework proposed by the U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment and the U.S. Department ofJustice to enhance the currently existing U.S. anti-money
laundering framework. 3 This National Strategy identified financial service providers, such
as broker-dealers and insurance companies, as needing to be included within the scope of
financial institutions subject to the framework. The National Strategy also contemplated
implementing anti-money laundering requirements for attorneys, accountants, and other
professional service providers. One aspect of the National Strategy that received substantive
criticism is the proposal for a new U.S. methodology for identifying and imposing unilateral
sanctions against "financial crime havens." 4 The National Strategy urged the enactment
of legislation called the International Counter-Money Laundering Act of 2000 that would
give the U.S. Treasury the authority to take "targeted, narrowly tailored and proportional
action against those jurisdictions, foreign financial institutions, or types of transactions that
pose particular money laundering threats."'"
The National Strategy also called for the U.S. Treasury and the federal banking author-
ities, among others, "to develop guidance for financial institutions to conduct enhanced
scrutiny of those customers and their transactions that pose a heightened risk of money
laundering and other financial crimes."' 6 An expert-level working group including the bank-
ing authorities reviewed several areas of potentially high-risk activity for which enhanced
scrutiny may be appropriate and has focused on a type of activity involving senior foreign
10. See Basle Committee, Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of Money-
Laundering (Dec. 1988), available at http://www.bis.org/publ'bcbscl 37.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2001).
11. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATE BANKING: RAUL SALINAS, CITIBANK, AND ALLEGED
MONEY LAUNDERING, GAO/OSI-99-1 (Oct. 1998), available at http://www.aci.net/kalliste/os99001.pdf;Pavlov
v. Bank of N.Y. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 426 (2001).
12. See 63 Fed. Reg. 67,536 (Dec. 7, 1998) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 208, 211, and 225); see also U.S.
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, BANK SECRECY ACT EXAMINATION MANUAL (Sept. 1997), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/bsa/7-oobsaman.pdf(last visited Mar. 27, 2002).
13. See U.S. DEP'T OF TEASURY & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY
FOR 2000 (Mar. 2000), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/docs/m/2000.pdf. (last visited Mar.
27, 2002).
14. Id. at 4.
15. Id. at 58.
16. Id. at 41.
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political figures, their immediate family, or their close associates that may involve the pro-
ceeds of foreign official corruption. The working group recognized that banking organi-
zations should be taking all reasonable steps to ensure that they do not knowingly or un-
wittingly assist in hiding or moving the proceeds of corruption by senior foreign political
figures and those associated with them. Therefore, the working group developed guidance
for banking organizations relating to their dealings with foreign political figures. The guid-
ance provides advice to assist banks and other financial institutions in applying enhanced
scrutiny to transactions by senior foreign political figures and closely related persons and
entities, so that the institutions may more effectively detect and deter organizations in
protecting themselves from being used as conduits for such transactions. 7
Arguably, one could reasonably assert that immediately before September 11, the req-
uisite "building blocks" for a comprehensive and vigorous U.S. anti-money laundering
regime were already in place. At that time, there was an updated Bank Secrecy Act,'" a
related regulatory compliance program and examination system, 19 and a highly developed
National Strategy in place.2o In addition, the frenetic Y2-K regulatory supervisory and
financial industry "fire drill" attendant to the feared, but non-occurring Y2-K dilemma
placed the U.S. financial system in good stead to withhold an attack on the U.S. payment
system and on the financial system's computer networks.21 Further, as discussed below, the
foundation for an interwoven and supporting international framework was also in place
pre-September 11.22 In effect, the basic components for creating an emergency, security-
oriented, and anti-terrorism-based framework was already on the shelf pre-September 11.
Immediately prior to the September 1 lth attack, the U.S. Executive issued its 2001 Na-
tional Money Laundering Strategy.23 In addition, the government reemphasized targeted
enforcement, increased international cooperation and cooperative public-private efforts, en-
hanced enforcement weapons, and proposed a uniform measurement system, including
quantitative and qualitative indicators to evaluate the effectiveness of the related law en-
forcement and the attainment of the desired goals. The September 2001 Strategy also
hinted at broader responsibilities and liabilities for lawyers and their professions.
After September 11, however, a major shift in U.S. Executive policy took place. Measures
that were squarely rejected in the 1999 congressional bill, such as "Know Your Customer"
rules and brokers-dealers reporting and record keeping duties, were accepted promptly and
without challenge as part of the much wider USA PATRIOT Act.
1. Aggressive Extraterritoriality
The extraterritorial reach of the Act is captured in its preamble. According to the pre-
amble, the purpose of the Act is "[t]o deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States
17. See, e.g., U.S. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, GUIDANCE ON ENHANCED SCRUTINY FOR TRANSACTIONS THAT
MAY INVOLVE THE PROCEEDS OP FOREIGN OFFICIAL CORRUPTION, SR 01-03 (SUP) (Jan. 16, 2001), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SRLetters/2001/srO103.htn.
18. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5330 (2000).
19. See 63 Fed. Reg. 67,536; U.S. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, BANK SECRECY ACT EXAMINATION MANUAL,supra
note 12.
20. NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY FOR 2000, supra note 13.
21. Chairman Alan Greenspan, Remarks Before the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion, Financial
Sector Group, Year 2000 Summit (Sept. 17, 1999), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches/1999/19990917.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2002).
22. See also David R. Sahr and Daniel Morales, New U.S. Money Laundering Legislation, 18 REv OF BANK. &
FIN. SERE. No. 2 (Special Suppl.) (Feb. 13, 2002).
23. See 2001 NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 9.
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and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other pur-
poses." 4 The extraterritoriality of the Act is made explicit in defining the scope of the
deterrence function to encompass the whole world.
The Act extends the regulatory and enforcement jurisdiction to foreign financial insti-
tutions and to foreigners not residing within the jurisdiction of the United States in two
ways: direct extraterritoriality and indirect extraterritoriality.
a. Direct Extraterritoriality
Direct extraterritoriality involves direct enforcement action taken by a U.S. government
agency against a foreign financial institution. The Act establishes such extraterritorial ju-
risdiction in two cases.
First, the district courts have adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction over foreign fi-
nancial institutions with respect to violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1956, which concerns laun-
dering monetary instruments when the foreign financial institution maintains a bank ac-
count at a financial institution in the United States. This means that if a foreign financial
institution engages in a financial transaction proscribed by this section, this institution may
become subject to the jurisdiction of the United States district courts even if the transaction
was conducted entirely outside the United States. This is based merely on the fact that the
foreign financial institution holds an account at a U.S. financial institution.
Second, the Act empowers the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General to
issue a summons or subpoena to any foreign bank that maintains a correspondent account
in the United States requesting the bank to produce records pertaining to that account
even if these records were held abroad. Failure to comply with the request will result in
terminating the Bank's correspondence relationship in the United States. Contesting the
summons or subpoena is only valid before United States courts.
These provisions seem to suggest that keeping an account in the United States is sufficient
basis for territorial jurisdiction over the account holder regardless of that holder's nation-
ality, place of residence, or place of conducting his business operations.
b. Indirect Extraterritoriality
Indirect extraterritoriality involves indirectly imposing regulatory requirements on for-
eign financial institutions through duties imposed on domestic institutions. This method is
used extensively in the Act and bears significant implications for foreign and domestic
institutions.
(i) The Secretary of the Treasury has the power to determine that specific foreign jurisdic-
tions, certain financial institutions operating outside the United States, classes of international
transactions, or types of accounts are of particular money laundering concern. Once the Sec-
retary so determines, he may impose extensive reporting and record keeping requirements on
domestic financial institutions with respect to those categories of jurisdictions, institutions,
transactions, or accounts. The requirements may include:
* Recording or reporting the identity or legal capacity of all participants or beneficial owners.
* In the case of opening a correspondence account under such circumstances, reporting or
recording the identity of each customer who is permitted to use the account or whose trans-
actions are routed through it. The identification should be comparable to that conducted
with respect to domestic customers.
24. USA PATRIOT Act preamble, 115 Stat. at 272.
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(ii) Under certain circumstances, domestic institutions maintaining a correspondent ac-
count for a foreign financial institution are required to ascertain the identity of all the owners
of that foreign bank, including the extent of their ownership interest. Further, they may be
required to ascertain whether such foreign banks provide correspondence accounts to other
foreign banks and, if so, the identity of those banks.
(iii) In order to enforce forfeiture orders against funds held in an account at a foreign bank,
the Act uses legal fiction. If the foreign bank has an account in the United States, the Act
deems the funds to have been deposited in this account and enforces the forfeiture order
against the funds available in that account without a tracing requirement by the government.
Any order will be served on the domestic institution that holds the interbank account.
2. Extending the Scope of Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements to Broker Deals and
Correspondent with Foreign "Shell Banks"
The USA PATRIOT Act extends the scope of the reporting and record keeping require-
ments to new categories of financial intermediaries and business operations; this includes
but is not restricted to:
(i) The Secretary of the U.S. Treasury is required by the Act to issue regulations requiring
brokers and dealers to submit suspicious activity reports (SARs). The scope of brokers-dealers'
obligations in the prevention of money laundering is not going to be restricted to SARs. The
Interim Guidance issued by the Treasury on November 20, 2001, indicates that the Treasury
intends to use its authority under the Act to issue a rule expanding the meaning of the term
Correspondent Account under the Act to prohibit non-bank covered financial institutions (in-
cluding brokers and dealers) from maintaining an account for a foreign shell bank and to
require such institutions to take reasonable steps to ensure that any account maintained for a
foreign institution is not used indirectly to provide services to a 'shell bank.'2 5
The Act also amended the relevant provision of the BSA to include within the scope of
its obligations the underground bankcing systems defined as: "any person who engages as a
business in an informal money transfer system or any network of people who engage as a
business in facilitating the transfer of money domestically or internationally outside of the
conventional financial institutions system. '2 6
The USA PATRIOT Act also extends the scope of the requirements by imposing new
record keeping and reporting obligations on the financial institutions. In addition to the
requirements discussed above in the previous section on indirect extraterritoriality, the Act
adds a controversial requirement, namely, the requirement to verify the identity of any
customer opening an account according to minimum standards to be specified through
regulations by the Secretary of the Treasury.
The financial institutions are also required to consult lists of known or suspected terrorists
to be provided by the government to determine whether a person seeking to open an
account appears on any such list.
3. Information Sharing
The Act generally relaxes the rules regarding access to information gathered by financial
institutions and enforcement agencies. The Act permits financial institutions to share in-
25. See Press Release, U.S. Treasury, Interim Guidance Concerning Compliance by Covered U.S. Financial
Institutions with New Statutory Anti-Money Laundering Requirements Regarding Correspondent Accounts
Established or Maintained for Foreign Banking Institutions (Nov. 20, 2001), available athttp://www.reas.gov/
presslreleases/regs.hun (last visitedJan. 31, 2002).
26. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 5, § 359.
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formation pertinent to money laundering risks amongst themselves and with enforcement
agencies. The Act further relaxes the rules regarding the Secretary of the Treasury's power
to disclose information reported by financial institutions to other government agencies.
One of the most important developments in this regard under the Act is the inclusion of
intelligence agencies among the government agencies to which disclosure of reported in-
formation may be made. This development was of such high priority in the minds of the
drafters that it was included in an explicit amendment of the Purpose of the BSA.
The Purpose now reads: "It is the purpose of this subchapter ... to require certain
reports or records where they have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax or regulatory
investigations or proceedings, or in the conduct of intelligence activities, including analysis, to
protect against international terrorism."27 (Emphasis added) The italicised part of the section
was added by the USA PATRIOT Act. This development in the Act is enforced by imposing
strict time limits on the financial institutions' response to certain requests of information.
B. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
1. The United Nations Response
a. Security Council Resolution 1373
Only seven days after the terrorist attacks in the United States, the U.N. Security Council
adopted a comprehensive Resolution 1373 affirming its condemnation of the attacks and
elaborating steps and strategies to be adopted for the purpose of combating international
terrorism." The Resolution also encompassed an implementation mechanism in the form
of a Council Committee whose task is to monitor the implementation and to whom States
are required to report on their actions towards combating terrorism.29
Like other domestic and international responses, the Resolution focused on terrorist
financing as a primary target for suppressing this phenomenon. In the preamble, the Se-
curity Council recognizes "the need for States to complement international cooperation by
taking additional measures to prevent and suppress, in their territories through all lawful
means, the financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism."30 The decision to "[p]revent
and suppress the financing of terrorist acts" also constitutes the first decision expressed in
the Resolution."
The Council envisages implementing this decision through various means: (1) the crim-
inalization of willful provision or collection of funds with the intention or knowledge that
these funds be used to carry out terrorist activities; (2) the freezing of terrorist assets defined
very broadly; and (3) the prohibition of making any funds, financial assets, or economic
resources or financial or other related services available to terrorists or entities and persons
controlled by them. The latter method of suppression is clearly drafted with financial in-
stitutions and their services in mind.
States are also specifically required to extend maximum assistance to other States in their
criminal investigations or proceedings relating to the financing of terrorist acts. This assis-
tance is particularly required with respect to obtaining material evidence in their possession.
27. Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5311, as amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 358, 115 Stat. at 326.
28. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess. 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. I I(a).
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b. The General Assembly Action on Terrorism
The action of the United Nations legislative body on the suppression of terrorism long
precedes the events of September 11. A review of this action is well beyond the scope of
this paper. The recent United Nations International Convention on the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism,32 however, merits special attention. This is due to the fact that the
provisions of this Convention were incorporated in all instruments that followed the events
hence entering a new stage of their life subsequent to these tragic incidents.
The U.N. Convention is based on a number of premises, two of which are relevant to
the present context. The first is that "the financing of terrorism is a matter of grave concern
to the international community as a whole,"3 3 and the second is that "the number and
seriousness of acts of international terrorism depend on the financing that terrorists may
obtain."34 The Preamble further confirms the absence of any emphasis in existing multi-
lateral anti-terrorism instruments on terrorist financing and hence the need for an instru-
ment that addresses this omission.
(i) Criminalisation of Terrorist Financing. The key provision of this Convention con-
cerns the criminalisation of terrorist financing. According to article 2 of the Convention, a
person commits an offence
[I]f that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects
funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used,
in full or in part, in order to carry out: (a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope
of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex; or (b) Any other act intended to
cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active
part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its
nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.33
This provision criminalizes two types of acts-the provisions of funds to such terrorist
purposes and the collection of funds for these purposes. While the provision includes a
mental element, this element is diluted by equating actual intent to direct the funds to
terrorist purposes with mere knowledge of the ultimate destination of such funds.
The Convention does not criminalize the act of hiding the existence or the destination
of the funds. Using the term very loosely, one may say that the Convention does not
criminalize the laundering of funds intended for terrorist purposes. It does not require the
States Parties to include this offence as a predicate offence to money laundering.
(ii) Funds and Proceeds. The Convention distinguishes between the terms "funds" and
"proceeds." Funds is defined very broadly to mean:
every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal
documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or
32. This U.N. Convention was finalised on December 9,1999, and was adopted by the U.N. pursuant to
G.A. Res. 109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (2000). The Convention, at the date of
this article, has not been entered into the United Nations Treaty Series (U.N.T.S). However, copies of the




35. Id. art. 2.1(a), (b).
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interest in, such assets, including, but not limited to, bank credits, travellers cheques, bank
cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts and letters of credit.3 6 (Emphasis added)
The operative words in the definition, which sum up the difference between terrorist
finance and the property that is normally targeted by money laundering law, are "however
acquired." The property so far dealt with by money laundering law is tainted property in
the sense that it is, albeit with tremendous effort, traceable to a form of illegal activity that
generated it. Terrorist finance, on the other hand, could be derived from perfectly legitimate
sources. The illegitimacy of the money in the latter case stems from its intended use and
not from its origin.
This distinction is reflected in the fact that the Convention distinguishes between the
two terms "funds" and "proceeds" and defines the latter as funds derived from or obtained
from the commission of the offence described above." Article 8 of the Convention imposes
an obligation on State Parties to put in place any measures necessary for the identification,
detection, freezing, seizure, and forfeiture of both "funds" and "proceeds" connected with
the offences set in article 2.
(iii) The Role of Financial Institutions under the Convention. It has become standard in
the U.N. Conventions that deal with cooperation in freezing, seizure, and confiscation of
assets to stipulate that bank secrecy may not be offered as grounds for denying requests for
mutual legal assistance. Article 12 of the present Convention establishes this principle.
In addressing States Parties' obligations to prevent the incidence of the offences created
by the Convention, article 18 enumerates measures similar to those that are implemented
in the context of preventing the use of the financial system for money laundering purposes.
The preventive measures envisioned by this article include: know your customer regula-
tions, prohibition of opening anonymous accounts, suspicious transactions reporting re-
quirements, and record keeping requirements.
The significance of this instrument stems from the fact that it is the first international
treaty to address the preventive aspects of money laundering. While criminalisation of
money laundering and the definition of the offence have always been based on the treaty
definition incorporated in the Vienna Convention 1988, the preventive measures were al-
ways based on soft law instruments such as the FATF Forty Recommendations.
2. The Financial Action Task Force
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an international body focusing on studying
the phenomenon of money laundering and building consensus around measures to combat
it. It was established in 1989 by the G-7. Following the terrorist attacks in the United
States, the FATF held an extraordinary Plenary meeting in Washington, D.C. on October
29-30, 2001 for the purpose of launching an initiative to combat terrorist financing.
Although terrorism was never excluded from the agenda of money laundering control as
envisioned by the FAT, the FATF in its work was more focused on economically motivated
crime that generates illegitimate funds. According to the pronouncement of the FATF
following its extraordinary meeting, "Addressing the financing of terrorism will be a new
focus for the FATF and is a natural complement to its mandate to fight all aspects of money
laundering."38
36. Id. art. 1.1.
37. Id. art. 1.3.
38. FATF, News Release, FATF Meets in Emergency Session (Oct. 25, 2001), available at http://
www.oecd.org/fatf (last visited Jan. 28, 2002).
VOL. 36, NO. 1
MONEY LAUNDERING LAW AND TERRORIST FINANCING 113
The extraordinary meeting resulted in developing a set of eight recommendations on
terrorist financing to complement the FATF Forty Recommendations on money launder-
ing. These recommendations commit the members of the body to the following actions:
" To fully ratify and implement the U.N. instruments including particularly the 1999 U.N.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
" To make the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organisations a criminal
offence, and to designate such offences as predicate offences for money laundering.
" To freeze and confiscate terrorist assets.
" To report suspicious transactions related to terrorism.
" To cooperate as extensively as possible with other countries' enforcement efforts relating
to terrorist financing investigations.
" To impose anti-money laundering requirements on alternative remittance systems.
" Strengthen customer identification measures in international and domestic wire transfers.
" Amend laws and regulations to ensure that non-profit organizations are not abused for
the purposes of terrorist financing.19
The extraordinary Plenary also agreed to a rigorous plan of action including: (1) com-
mitment by members to conduct a process of self-evaluation against the eight recommen-
dations and a commitment to come into full compliance byJune 2002; (2) commitment by
the FATF to produce further guidance on the techniques of terrorist financing by February
2002; (3) initiating a process of identifying jurisdictions that lack appropriate mechanisms
for combating terrorist financing with the possibility of counter measures; and (4) com-
mitment by the FATF to provide technical assistance to non-members in order to assist
them in compliance.4
Six of the eight Special Recommendations are specifically concerned with the new subject
matter of terrorist financing. The recommendations concerning wire transfers and alter-
native remittance systems are merely an expansion of the money laundering regime as a
whole to address the problem of terrorist finance, but not specific to it.
The Special Recommendations were in many respects an exercise in re-defining some of
the key terms in money laundering law to fit this new focus on terrorist financing. These
terms include the term "property" for the purposes of seizure and confiscation measures.
Under the FATF Forty Recommendations on money laundering, property to be seized or
confiscated includes "property laundered, proceeds from, instrumentalities used in or in-
tended for use in the commission of any money laundering offence." 4 Under the Special
Recommendations, this concept is expanded in order to accommodate the particular nature
of terrorist financing to include "property that is the proceeds of, or used in, or intended
or allocated for use in, the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist organizations. 42
The term "funds" for the purposes of suspicious transactions reporting has also been
amended. Under the Forty Recommendations it was proposed that financial institutions
39. FATF, SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON TERRORIST FINANCING (Oct. 31, 2001), available at http://
www.oecd.org/fatf Oast visited Jan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS].
40. FATF, News Release, FATF Cracks Down on Terrorist Financing (Oct. 25, 2001), available at htrp://
www.oecd.org/fatf Oast visited Jan. 28, 2002).
41. FATF, THE FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS, Recommendation 7, as amended (1990), available at http://
www.oecd.org/fatf (last visitedJan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS].
42. SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 39, Recommendation III.
43. FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 41, Recommendation 15.
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should be required to report their suspicions that "funds stem from a criminal activity."43
Under the new Special Recommendations, suspicious transactions reporting should extend
to funds that are "linked or related to, or are to be used for terrorism, terrorist acts or by
terrorist organizations."44 It thus becomes apparent that, terrorist financing is gradually
becoming a special area of money laundering that will eventually develop its own body of
law and jurisprudence.
C. THE EUROPEAN REsPONSE
1. The European Union
Following the attacks in the United States, the European Union perceived itself to be
one of the leading partners in the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism.45 This has resulted
in taking an extensive number of measures at various fronts including: police and judicial
cooperation, diplomacy, humanitarian aid, air transport safety, economic and financial mea-
sures, and emergency preparations. This section is particularly concerned with legal de-
velopments as they relate to the question of terrorist financing and the role of financial
institutions.
On September 21, 2001, the European Council held an extraordinary meeting and
adopted a Plan of Action against terrorism.6 Like other domestic and international instru-
ments that developed in response to the attacks, the Council's Plan of Action focuses on
interstate cooperation in penal matters, criminalization of terrorism, combating terrorist
financing, and exchange of information for intelligence purposes.
The main development in the area of penal cooperation concerns the agreement on
expediting the introduction of a European arrest warrant as a substitute for traditional
extradition procedures. According to the proposed procedure, perpetrators of terrorist at-
tacks could be handed directly from one judicial authority of a member state to another's
without need to go through the more cumbersome extradition channels. This proposal was
based on a sense that current extradition procedures do not reflect the present degree of
confidence and integration amongst Member States.47
The Council, like other agencies since September 11, has placed particular emphasis on
funding of terrorism and described combating it as a "decisive aspect. '4 The Council also
emphasized the importance of extending the scope of EU instruments on money laundering
and on freezing assets to terrorists' financing.
The European response also involved a number of measures dedicated to enhancing the
flow of information for intelligence purposes. In its Plan of Action, the Council indicated,
"improved cooperation and exchange of information between all intelligence services of the
Union will be required." 49 In a similar vein, the Justice and Home Affairs Council of the
European Council indicated that the EU and Member States "will decide to rapidly adopt
44. SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 39, Recommendation HII.
45. For an overview of this response, see Report from the Commission, Overview of EU Action in response
to the events of 11 September and assessment of their likely economic impact (Oct. 17, 2001) COM(2001)
611.
46. The European Council, Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European CouncilMeeting
on Sept. 21,2001, SN 140/01, available at http://europa.eu.int [hereinafter Conclusions and Plan of Action].
47. Id. 2(1), at 1-2.
48. Id. 5, at 2.
49. Id. 2(1), at 1-2.
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provisions for extending mechanisms for automatic exchanges of information between na-
tional financial intelligence units to data concerning all sources of terrorist funding." 0
2. The United Kingdom Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
On October 15, 2001, the Home Secretary and the Chancellor announced proposals to
introduce urgent measures giving the government additional powers to enable it to counter
the threat of international terrorism. On November 12, 2001, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime
and Security Bill was introduced to the House of Commons and passed into law on De-
cember 14, 2001. The speed with which this Act has passed is particularly staggering in
view of the extent of power it grants to law enforcement agencies and the extent of intrusion
on the realm of privacy and civil rights it exercises. It is not, however, any different in terms
of its speed and intrusion from any of the other instruments, both domestic and interna-
tional, of this period.
The Act like the other instruments places primary emphasis on financing of terrorism as
key to the fight against this international threat. In this regard the Act extends the now
familiar powers of seizure and forfeiture and disclosure and sharing of information for
investigative and intelligence purposes. The Act deals with this problem in Part 1 under
"Terrorist Property." It defines terrorist cash as "cash which--(a) is intended to be used for
the purposes of terrorism, (b) consists of resources of an organisation which is a proscribed
organisation, or (c) is, or represents, property obtained through terrorism."' Schedule 1
grants a wide range of seizure and forfeiture powers with regard to this type of property.
Part 3 of the Act concerning "Disclosure of Information" proved particularly controver-
sial. Like other legal instruments of this period, it extends existing disclosure powers dras-
tically. Article 17(2) extends disclosure power under a long list of existing laws included in
Schedule 4 of the Act to include disclosure requested for the purpose of criminal investi-
gation, criminal proceedings, and the broader purpose of facilitating a determination of
whether any such investigation or proceeding is needed. These new disclosure powers are
more extensive than they seem once one takes into consideration the blanket authorization
granted to the Treasury to extend the application of this section to any disclosure provisions
included in any subordinate legislation.
The investigatory and intelligence spirit of the Act is captured in section 19, which re-
moves any secrecy obligation pertaining to information held by the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice and permits the disclosure of this information for the purpose of any criminal inves-
tigation or proceedings or for the purpose of facilitating the carrying out of intelligence
functions by intelligence services.
The Act also creates various obligations that would affect financial institutions and their
role in the fight against international terrorism. One example suffices to illustrate this point
for the purposes of this brief overview. According to Schedule 2, a financial institution may
be ordered by the Crown Court on the basis of an application submitted by a police officer
to monitor one or more accounts for a specified period of time. The institution will then
be required to provide certain specified information to an appropriate officer. The order
will be granted for the purpose of a terrorist investigation and tracing of terrorist property
50. Conclusions adopted by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs), Brussels, Sept. 20, 2001, SN 3926/6/
01 REV 6 at 21, available at http://europa.eu.int [hereinafterJustice and Home Affairs Council Conclusions].
51. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, pt. 1, § 1(1), available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/
acts2001/20010024.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2002).
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as long as the court is satisfied that the order will enhance the effectiveness of the investi-
gation.
D. DECIPHERING THE TRENDS
This brief survey of the legal responses to the events of September 11 show that over
this very short span of time a certain consensus has emerged regarding the legal measures
necessary to respond to the problem of international terrorism. This section will attempt
to distill the trends established by this rapid proliferation of legal instruments.
1. The Trend towards Extraterritoriality
Extraterritoriality understood broadly as the extension of jurisdiction beyond the terri-
torial scope of a certain country or organization is the first trend that marks the various
responses examined in this brief account. As discussed above under section 2(A)(1) "Ag-
gressive Extraterritoriality," the USA PATRIOT Act granted U.S. agencies extensive direct
and indirect extraterritorial powers vis-h-vis foreign financial institutions and individuals.
The Act seems to establish the holding of an account by a foreigner in a U.S. financial
institution as sufficient nexus for territorial jurisdiction for a variety of purposes.
The FATF also envisages extraterritorial measures as part of its Plan of Action for com-
bating terrorist financing. The FATF plans to review non-member jurisdictions in terms
of the adequacy of their legal and regulatory systems for countering terrorist financing.
Failure to meet the threshold set by the FATF will result in imposing sanctions that amount
to denial of such countries into the international financial system. These actions by the
FATF will be supported and implemented by its members. s2 This is already incorporated
within the USA PATRIOT Act. A section on "Special Due Diligence for Correspondent
Accounts and Private Banking Accounts" provides that financial institutions should apply
additional standards of due diligence when they hold correspondent accounts on behalf of
a foreign bank operating "under a banking license issued by a foreign country that has been
designated as non-cooperative with international anti-money laundering principles or pro-
cedures by an intergovernmental group or organization of which the United States is a
member.""
2. Public-Private Partnership
Partnership between the public and private in policing the channels of international
finance is a feature of money laundering law generally. What September 11 did was to
accentuate this trend and remove any reluctance or inhibition in passing on further policing
obligations to the private partners. As the survey of the various instruments shows, the
expectations of financial institutions are high and the obligations are open-ended with ex-
tensive delegation of power to regulate and demand more cooperation to the executive.
Additional private institutions are enlisted such as brokers and dealers under the USA
PATRIOT Act.
52. This was confirmed in the Conclusions adopted by the Council, "the Council will examine the measures
to be taken vis-a-vis non-cooperative courts and territories identified by the FATF in order to intensify the
fight against the financing of terrorism."Justice and Home Affairs Council Conclusions, supra note 50, $ 23.
53. USA PATRIOT Act § 312, 115 Stat. at 304.
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3. Open Access to Information
All the instruments discussed in the previous sections invariably mandate more fluid flow
of information amongst financial institutions, regulators, the police and investigators, and
intelligence agencies. Due process and privacy inhibitions to such unrestricted flow are
marginalized.
4. De-liberalisation Trends
In order to enforce the aggressive extraterritoriality referred to above, the FATF and its
members rely heavily on their capacity to shut foreign financial institutions out of the global
financial market through unilateral and concerted action. Considering the importance of
free flow of capital for economic liberalisation generally, which constitutes the conventional
wisdom since the Second World War, such measures have the potential of substantially
reversing the liberalisation process.
M. Implications for Financial Institutions
The size of the September 11 th attacks and the amount of resources that appear to have
been pooled in order to carry them out serves to explain the concern for terrorist financing
that predominates the legal response to these event as reflected in the instruments discussed.
The outcome of this concern is that financial institutions are now saddled with a baggage
of new responsibilities that we cannot yet begin to assess. After discussing the response of
financial institutions to their new and undefined responsibilities, this section will turn to a
discussion of the potential issues of concern for these institutions and attempt to sketch the
changes with which they will have to struggle.
A. FiNNqCiAL INSTITUTIONs RESPONSE
Considering the specific target of the September 11 th attacks, the U.S. financial insti-
tutions felt that the attacks did not only target their country as a whole but they were
specifically directed at them. 4 This explains the response of the financial institutions, which
combined the zealousness of patriotism and vengeance. The response could be described
as threefold: (1) full support and swift implementation of the President's Executive Order
to block terrorist assets; (2) close cooperation with law enforcement officials tracking the
flow of terrorist funds; and (3) full support of the legislative initiative to strengthen money
laundering laws as tools in the fight against terrorism.
The industry supported the USA PATRIOT Act at its various stages in the Congress and
worked closely with the congressional committees and the Administration to take the leg-
islation through Congress as quickly as possible. Although the industry has a good record
of cooperation with the Congress and the Administration on matters pertaining to money
54. We were all shocked and saddened by the horrific events of September 11, and we mourn the loss of
our friends and colleagues and all others who lost their lives in New York City, Pennsylvania, and the
Pentagon. As you know the financial community was particularly hard hit by the attack. However, if
one of the goals of the attack on New York was an attempt to seriously disrupt the banking system,
that goal was not met.
Testimony of Edward L. Yingling, On Behalf of the American Bankers Association Before the Committee on
Financial Services, United States House of Representatives (Oct. 3, 2001), available at http://www.aba.com.
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laundering law, this understandably unquestioning acquiescence has certainly deprived the
legislative process of an important and healthy debate. This is, however, not unusual in
cases of emergency legislation.
Despite the full support of the legislation given by the industry, there has been some
expression of caution. In the testimony by the executive vice president of the American Bank-
ers Association (ABA) before the House Committee on Financial Services, he expressed some
caution with regard to requirements for customer identification in transactions with foreign
entities and the risk of excessive and unjustifiable burden on the industry in this area. He
stated, "While banks can and should report activities that raise suspicions of violations of law,
government agencies must often take the lead in identifying problem countries, groups, in-
dividuals, and transactions and then asking banks to act upon that information. It must be a
true public-private partnership, working together."" He also emphasized that generally banks
have limited ability to acquire information about their customers beyond the information
provided in the process of conducting a financial transaction. 6
Reading the testimony, it becomes apparent that the industry's approach as expressed by
the ABA is to grant full support for the legislation thus accommodating the demands of
emergency and the need for national solidarity. The industry, however, is aware of the
potential pitfalls and aims to seek the fine-tuning of the legislation at the stage of regulatory
implementation. This is reflected in the ABA's support for a flexible regulatory power for
the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to foreign jurisdictions, institutions, and trans-
actions that are of primary money laundering concern." This is accompanied by emphasis
on the need for consultation with the industry and regulatory streamlining of due diligence
procedures. 8 The logic of this approach is grounded in the close cooperation between the
industry and the government in regulating for money laundering prevention that has in
place since the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act (1992).1 9 The Act authorized
the creation of the Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group as interdisciplinary panel of experts
from the financial community, regulatory community, and law enforcement community
chaired by the Treasury Department's Under Secretary for Enforcement. The Group fo-
cuses on enhancing the effectiveness of money laundering law while reducing the regulatory
burden on financial institutions.
B. ISSUES OF CONCERN: INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE
Concerns from the industry perspective stem from two sources: (1) liability, and (2) reg-
ulatory burden. The new anti-terrorism initiatives are rife with potential for both. This
section will address in a preliminary form both these aspects.
The Nature of Terrorist Funds: Implication for Suspicious Transactions Reporting
Money laundering law so far has proceeded from concern over the drug trafficking problem
and its proceeds. As a body of law and its implementation has thus been designed to detect
and trace ill-gotten gains. In discussing the various instruments above, it has become ap-
parent that inclusion of terrorist financing control amongst the purposes of money laun-
dering law will require substantial re-adjustment of the definition of terms in this area. The
55. Id. at 13.
56. Id. at 12.
57. Id. at 9.
58. Id. at 10.
59. Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 4044, 4045-51.
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main difference between the laundering of criminal proceeds and terrorist financing is that
the former is tainted by virtue of its source and the latter is tainted by virtue of its purpose.
This difference is bound to have implications for the definition of suspicion in suspicious
transaction reporting as well as for the definition of the crime of laundering in general.
Examining the definition of suspicious transactions reporting requirement under the
U.N. Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism6° serves to illustrate this
point. The Convention's definition in article 18 departs slightly from the formula of the
FATF Forty Recommendations discussed below. This departure is, however, sufficient to
accommodate the difference between the proceeds of crime targeted by the Recommen-
dations and terrorist financing targeted by the Convention. Recommendation 15 of the
FATF stipulates: "If financial institutions suspect thatfrnds stem from a criminal activity they
should be required to report promptly their suspicions to the competent authorities."61 By
contrast, article 18(b) of the U.N. Convention provides that States Parties should adopt
regulations that impose on financial institutions the obligation to "report transactions sus-
pected of stemmingfrom a criminal activity.' '62 While the FATF formula refers toffunds stem-
ming from a criminal activity, the Convention's formula refers to transactions stemming
from a criminal activity. The former focuses on the origin of the fund in establishing the
link and the latter focuses on the purpose of the transaction.
The financial industry in the United States did express a sense of the novelty of these
new definitions. The ABA's executive vice president expressed this in his testimony before
the House stating:
mhe money flows that support terrorist activities are in some ways quite different from those
that money laundering laws were originally primarily designed to prevent. Money laundering
laws initially targeted the channeling of funds arising from illegal activities (such as drug traf-
ficking) into the traditional banking system. Terrorists may not care whether the money is
'cleaned.'61
These developments will certainly mean re-investment in training the management and
employees in the enforcement of money laundering law as it is newly defined. Further, since
the funds in the case of terrorism are primarily only tainted by their purpose and the
suspicious transaction measures are preventive measures that if successful will prevent the
transaction from achieving its purpose, this created a great potential for liability for dis-
crimination on basis of origin, race, and religion. This is particularly true now that concern
for terrorism is pinned to a particular region and religious group.-4
C. DUE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
This concern is particularly pertinent to the USA PATRIOT Act.6 As discussed above,
this Act is primarily concerned with the relationship between U.S. financial institutions and
60. G.A. Res. 109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (2000).
61. FoRTY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 41, Recommendation 15.
62. G.A. Res. 109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (2000), art. 18(b).
63. Testimony of Edward L. Yingling, supra note 54, at 3.
64. For example of this type of liability, see Ricci v. Key Bancshares of Maine, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1132
(1987). In this case the plaintiff sued Bancshares of Maine for discrimination under the Equal Credit Oppor-
tunity Act for terminating his lines of credit immediately and without explanation. The Bank's action was based
on FBI information that the plaintiff is involved in organized crime. The jury awarded the plaintiff $15 million
in exemplary damages and $10,000 in punitive damages.
65. Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
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foreign persons. This emphasis has translated into provisions with pronounced extraterri-
torial reach.- The extraterritoriality embodied in the Act is bound to prove onerous both
for the U.S. financial institutions and the foreign financial institutions that they deal with.
Sections 311, 312, 313 and 319(b) deal with the relationship between U.S. financial
institutions and foreign jurisdictions. To guard against the money laundering risk inherent
in those transactions, the Act authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to impose on do-
mestic institutions record keeping and reporting duties that include the following:
" Ascertain the identity and the address of all participants in the relationship with the
foreign person;6
7
" Ascertain the identity of beneficial owners in such transactions and relationships; 6s
" Establish the legal capacity of the participant;69
" Ascertain the identity of each customer of a foreign financial institution who is permitted
to use directly or indirectly the account held by the U.S. Bank for that institutions; °
" Ascertain the owners of a foreign bank and he nature and extent of their ownership;" and
" Conduct due diligence exercises with respect to any foreign bank that receives corre-
spondent account services from a client foreign bank of the domestic institutions."
In carrying out these obligations the Act uses a vague standard of care based on reason-
ableness. With respect to the exercise of some of these due diligence requirements, the Act
refers to the Secretary of the Treasury to determine what constitutes reasonable and prac-
ticable steps." It is however important to note that some of the due diligence requirements
listed above are not contingent on the issuance of regulation. While the financial com-
munity maintained its support for the Act, there has been concern regarding the imple-
mentation of these requirements. As discussed above, this concern was tempered by the
hope that these matters could be further delineated and balanced in the process of drafting
the implementing regulations.
On November 20, 2001, the Treasury issued Interim Guidance Concerning Compliance
by Covered U.S. Financial Institutions with New Statutory Anti-Money Laundering Re-
quirements Regarding Correspondent Accounts Established or Maintained for Foreign
Banks.7 4 The notice described a certification that financial institutions may use in the in-
terim to assist them in meeting some of their obligations related to dealing with foreign
shell banks and foreign correspondence accounts. The Interim Guidance explicitly indicates
that this formal procedure does not satisfy the due diligence requirement under other pro-
visions of the Act except those specifically designated. This leaves the obligations open
ended and guided only by the vague test of "reasonable steps." s5
66. See Part II (A)(1), supra.




71. Id. at 301.
72. Id.
73. 31 U.S.C. § 5318A(b)(2) as amended by section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, 115 Stat. at 300.
74. Interim Guidance Concerning Compliance by Covered U.S. Financial Institutions with New Statutory
Anti-Money Laundering Requirements Regarding Correspondent Accounts Established or Maintained for
Foreign Banks.
75. According to a Supervisory Letter by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Treasury
regulations should provide more guidance on the meaning of "reasonable steps," which is not defined in the
VOL. 36, NO. 1
MONEY LAUNDERING LAW AND TERRORIST FINANCING 121
Under "Know Your Customer" obligations of section 326 of the Act, financial institutions
are required to consult the list of suspected terrorists and terrorist organisations provided
by "any government agency" (emphasis added) to determine whether a potential customer
appears on the list. This could result in an enormous regulatory burden that is too soon to
assess. The financial institutions are already aware of problems imposed by the variations
in spelling of Arabic names. 76
The extraterritoriality of these provisions will also pose a significant problem for foreign
institutions where conflict exists between the requirements of U.S. law and those of the
foreign law. The Act does not deal with this problem except inasmuch as it expects foreign
jurisdictions to align their laws with the United States' approach.
D. ExctIANGE OF INFORMATION
The wide disclosure requirements and the relaxed procedures for disclosure that is char-
acteristic of the instruments issued in response to the September 11 are bound to create
vexing liability questions. The scenario of Ricci v. Key Bancsbares of Maine, Inc." discussed
above is very likely to recur under such a system of fluid information exchange.
The USA PATRIOT Act envisages this potential liability and provides a safe harbour
provision in section 314 stating,
A financial institution or association that transmits, receives, or shares such information for
the purposes of identifying and reporting activities that may involve terrorist acts or money
laundering activities shall not be liable to any person under any law or regulation of the United
States, any constitution, law, or regulation of any State or political subdivision thereof, or under
any contract or other legally enforceable agreement (including any arbitration agreement), for
such disclosure."
While this safe harbour provision would protect the financial institutions against any
liability for breach of any duties of confidentiality either contractual or statutory, the ques-
tion is whether it will shelter the disclosing institution against liability for harm to the
person subject to disclosure resulting from such disclosure. This is particularly relevant
considering the suspicious based nature of any disclosure and the chances for mistakes
resulting from confusion of identities. A possibility already captured in the concern ex-
pressed regarding the difficulty of establishing the identity of individuals bearing Arab
names due to the particular characteristics of these names.
Section 314(a) specifically encourages regulatory authorities and law enforcement au-
thorities to share with the financial institutions information regarding terrorists or terrorist
organizations or those who are reasonably suspected of engaging in terrorist activities. The
amount of information that might result from the application of this section is likely to be
of such enormity that it might exceed the processing capacities of financial institutions.
Act. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Supervisory Letter to the Officer in Charge of Su-
pervision and Appropriate Supervisory and Examination Staff at Each Federal Reserve Bank and to Each
Domestic and Foreign Banking Organization Supervised by the Federal Reserve Regarding the USA
PATRIOT Act and the International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001
(SR 01-29), Nov. 26, 2001.
76. Testimony of Edward L. Yingling, supra note 54, at 11.
77. Ricci v. Key Bancshares of Maine, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1132 (1987).
78. USA PATRIOT Act § 314, 115 Stat. at 308.
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Failure to act upon the delivered information might trigger the liability of the institution
concerned.
TV. Conclusion: Let's Go Back to Basics
The trends inherent in the international money laundering law regime that has signifi-
cantly evolved over the past several decades, particularly as driven by U.S. initiatives
through its own domestic FINCEN and the "multilateral" FATF were fully exploited in
the response to September 11. This reinvigorated and expanded focus presents significant
challenges to some of the basic legal and economic notions of order upon which our post-
World War H society is premised. Simply, by way of illustrations, the following three fun-
damental tensions arising are discussed; though, the authors suggest that these may well be
a small representation of the total fundamental tensions that will need to be identified,
analyzed, and dealt with in a measured and balanced way, and on policy and practical levels,
by governmental and intergovernmental decision-makers and by the constituents in their
respective political societies."
A. LIBERALIZATION V. ISOLATION
Liberalization is one of the components of what was once described as the "Washington
Consensus." A consensus that has been expressed repeatedly in the post-World War H
constitutions of the main global institutions: The International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, The International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization.s°
The post-September 11 th legal response represents a substantial reversal of this commit-
ment to a liberal integrated world. The mechanism of sanctioning certain jurisdictions
around the world by isolating them from the international community is bound in its ag-
gregate to undermine the values of liberalization. This is especially so when such sanctions
are implemented on an ad hoc rudimentary basis without due consideration to their overall
impact on international trade and finance.
It is important to remember in this context that liberalization as a policy and a trend was
established in response to a security threat. The leaders of the World War II period have
come to realize that inter-War isolationist policies and the beggar-thy-neighbor measures
were one of the primary reasons for the Second World War. The natural consequence was
an absolute faith in the values of liberalization and integration amongst all countries of the
world. Isolationist policies brought a global security disaster once and there are no guar-
antees that it will fare and better this time.8'
79. For example, fundamental issues arise as to how these and other post September 1 th measures impact
fundamental Western notions of an "open society" and an "open and internationalised" World economy;
whether a multilateral v. regional v. unilateral approach or a combination of the afore is appropriate in these
circumstance (and whether the United States is really seeking a true multilateral approach or whether this is
more a fagade for U.S. unilateralism).
80. On the "Washington Consensus," see, inter alia, John Williamson (the originator of the term), What
Should the World Bank Think of the Washington Consensus? World Bank Research Paper (2000).
81. Cf. Statement by Mike Moore, Director-General of the WTO, "Open Societies Do Better" (Feb. 9,
2000), at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/spmm22-e.htm(last viewed on Apr. 20, 2002).
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B. CITIZENS V. NoN-CTIZENS
A pronounced feature of the instruments issued in response to the terrorist attacks is
their acquiescence to a concept of an inferior status for non-citizens. While this is more
evident in the immigration law aspect of these instruments and in the police powers aspects,
an element of this is bound to infiltrate the financial regulatory enforcement. This is ex-
pressed in a statement by the American Bankers Association supporting the measures that
would "improve the methods for identifying individual account holders, particularlyfor non-
U.S. citizens." (Emphasis added)
The shocking aspect of this feature is the sense of normality that is evident in statements
such as the one cited above and more widely in the press. The status of foreigners under
international law and in the custom of democratic nations was the subject of lengthy de-
velopments under international law. This status is reflected in principles such as "national
treatment," which is a common feature of international economic instruments. While ex-
ceptions to such principles abound under international law, especially for national security
consideration, nothing in the perception of the present author would justify such a blanket
reversal of the culture of "national treatment" that has developed in the past decades.8 2
C. RULE OF LAW (PRINCIPLES OF DUE PROCESS, SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL)
v. EXECUTIVE EFFICIENCY
When the constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act was challenged in the early 1970s
on grounds, amongst other things, of violating the Fourth Amendment rights of the banks
and their depositors, the court upheld the constitutionality arguing that under the Act and
the regulation the access to the information recorded by the financial institutions will only
be available subject to the existing legal process.8 3 Under the present amendments the
Secretary of the Treasury is empowered by the USA PATRIOT Act to make up the process
according to which information is to be disclosed. s+ The gap between the two approaches
is wide and the ease with which this development is accepted suggests that we have settled
very comfortably with the erosion of due process. This requires lengthy re-consideration.85
A further basic, but pervasive policy tension concerns whether, as we enter the new
millennium, we will continue to move toward "a new international financial architecture"
where under the driving policy goal is to foster financial stability and international-based
prudential standards in support of a managed liberalization offinancial markets;86 or, whether
we will let the "security, anti-terrorism tail" proverbially "wag" and skew the overall global
financial system. Certainly the long-term continuance of and reliance on rules and ap-
82. For general consideration of the individual under international law and international economic law, see,
inter alia, CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (5th ed. 2001).
83. The California Bankers Assoc. v. Shultz, 414 U.S. 816, 819 (1973).
84. USA PATRIOT Act § 314, 115 Star. at 307.
85. This notion of a basic substantive and procedural "due process" needs to be carefully considered also
on the international level (e.g., FATF processes). On the one hand, international authorities are insisting that
all countries adhere to international-based standards formulated by these largely informal international bodies,
yet these bodies themselves may not be operating themselves according to normally accepted "due-process"
standards.
86. See, inter alia, Joseph J Norton, A "New International Financial Architecture?" - Reflections on the Possible
Law-Based Dimensions, 33 IN'r'L LAW. 891-926 (2000).
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proaches designed to meet an extreme emergency situation will severely retard the world's
economic, financial and social needs to return to a modality of normalcy (albeit, perhaps not
the exact same normalcy as existed pre-September 11). Moreover, a prolonged and exag-
gerated reliance on such an emergency-based framework may well result in undesirable
deviations from basic and ingrained notions of some level of fundamental "due process"
(both domestic and international, and both substantive and procedural), notions that have
made the U.S. political and legal systems exemplary models for the rest of our world and
the main global guardian and promoter of the "rule of law."87 Indeed, it is time for us to
step back, take a deep breath and begin to evaluate in a balanced, rational, and measured
manner the broader, fundamental, and longer-term implications of the post-September
11th responses. In addition, in such evaluation, it is essential that we begin to come to grasp
the "WHYs" of the situation."s
87. Cf AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TERRORISM AND THE LAW: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON MILITARY
COMMISSIONS (Jan. 4, 2002). It also is most important that the United States, in pursuit of its worthy anti-
terrorism goal, does not fall afoul of the fatal fallacy of the terrorists' own philosophy: that is, the ends justify
the means. Surely, this should not and cannot be the case in a rule-of-law-oriented society.
88. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Remarks at the International Conference on Financing for Devel-
opment (Mar. 22, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/ffd/statements/usaE.htm (last viewed on Apr. 20,2002);
IMFC Statement by Mr James D. Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank (Apr. 20, 2002), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/spring/2002/sm/eng/ibrd.htm;and the article by Mr. Craig Hall in this issue.
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